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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN ILLINOIS
No Illinois case has yet squarely held that a nurse, employed by a hos-
pital, may become the servant of a physician when assisting him in surgery.
Since control has been recognized as the key fact, both in ordinary cases
recognizing the "borrowed servant" doctrine, and as dicta in a few malprac-
tice cases, a change in the law may be predicted, at least as to the acts of
nurses in the presence of an operating surgeon. The surgeon is in absolute
control during an operation. His orders must be precisely carried out, and
he may even control the manner in which they are carried out. Balanced
against the construction of the surgeon as master are two factors. First, the
hospital staff is hired and fired by the hospital. Second, the hospital and not
the doctor pays their wages. However, these last two factors are merely
elements which tend to show that the surgeon does not exercise control
over a hospital nurse. But, in the context of the surgical theater, these
factors lose much of their relevance. Regardless of who hires and fires or
who pays wages, during the course of an operation it is the word of the
operating surgeon that controls the activities of the assisting nurses. This
actual control, based on both necessity and custom, results in destroying the
usual presumption of control that can be drawn from the fact that it is the
hospital that hires, fires, and pays the nurses. For these reasons, a change in
the law can be expected should a respondeat superior case reach the ap-
pellate courts which involves a nurse who is guilty of negligent conduct
during surgery in the presence of the surgeon.
MERRILL C. HOYT
SOME SPECIFIC AREAS OF MALPRACTICE
X-RAYs'
Liability for an injury caused by a physician's negligent use of X-rays
in treating a malady rests on the same principles of duty and standard of
care that exist in any instance of medical malpractice.2 Briefly, the ordinary
and reasonable care of other physicians in the use of X-rays must be
followed.
A more controversial area of X-ray negligence cases is that of evi-
dentiary requirements. The method of proof has changed as the scientific
undersanding of X-rays has increased.
Originally, when the use of X-ray treatment was thought to be fool-
proof, res ipsa loquitur was held to be sufficient to establish a cause of ac-
tion for negligence. In Holcomb v. Magee,3 the plaintiff's case was based on
the facts that he had X-ray burns, that the X-ray machine had been in the
1 See Annot. 13 A.L.R. 1414 (1921); supplemented 26 A.L.R. 732 (1923).
2 Simon v. Kaplan, 321 Ill. App. 203, 52 N.E.2d 832 (1st Dist. 1944).
3 217 Ill. App. 272 (2d Dist. 1920).
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sole control of the defendant and that the particular machine, if operated
with due care, would not cause burns. This evidence was held to establish
a prima facie case. Likewise, res ipsa loquitur was relied on in Johnson v.
Marshall.4 The court held that the injuries caused by X-ray treatment were
within the realm of common knowledge and consequently there was no
need for expert witnesses. The fact that an injury had occurred and this
was not the ordinary result established a rebuttable presumption of
negligence.
Other jurisdictions, at about the same time as the above two cases,
were reaching contrary decisions. 5 These courts held that X-ray treatment
was not foolproof. Certain variables such as length of treatment, distance
between treated area and machine, and current used were held to be ques-
tions of medical procedure and, as such, were matters requiring expert
testimony.
More recent Illinois cases have followed this reasoning. Expert testi-
mony has been used to establish the physician's negligence, although the
use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in this area, has not been expressly
barred. Expert testimony was relied on by the plaintiff in Merkle v.
Kegerreis.6 Likewise in Gorman v. St. Francis Hosp.,7 the First District
Appellate Court held that expert testimony was necessary to show accepted
medical procedure in the use of X-rays.
Thus, the trend is away from the use of res ipsa loquitur and emphasis
is being placed on the use of medical and scientific testimony.
DIAGNOSIS
Sims v. Parkers was the first case in Illinois that concerned a cause of
action for negligent diagnosis. The defendant had diagnosed the existence
of a hernia when, in fact, there was none. Testimony showed that the diag-
nosis of a hernia in people "as fleshy" as the plaintiff was, at best, difficult.
The court held that a physician is not liable for a mere mistake in diagnosis.
A breach of ordinary care must be shown before the mistake is actionable.
In McKee v. Allen,9 the defendant had diagnosed chronic rheumatism
and operated on the plaintiff in consequence of that diagnosis. The plain-
tiff contended that the proper diagnosis should have been acute rheumatism
and, therefore, the proper treatment should have been heat applications.
Medical testimony varied as to whether the plaintiff's syndrome indicated
chronic or acute rheumatism. Holding for the defendant, the court said that
4 241 Ill. App. 80 (2d Dist. 1926).
5 Stemons v. Turner, 274 Pa. 228, 117 Ad. 922, (1922); Street v. Hodgson, 139 Md. 137,
115 Ad. 27 (1921).
6 350 Ill. App. 103, 112 N.E.2d 175 (2d Dist. 1953).
7 60 IlU. App. 2d 441, 208 N.E.2d 653 (Ist Dist. 1965).
8 41 I1. App. 284 (lst Dist. 1891).
9 94 Ill. App. 147 (1st Dist. 1900).
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an error in diagnosis and subsequent treatment based on that diagnosis does
not subject a physician to liability unless the error is so gross as to be in-
consistent with ordinary and reasonable skill possessed by physicians.
Again, by the way of dicta, in Kruger v. McCaughey,'O the physician's
duty was said to be that of ordinary care in making his diagnosis.
The extent of examination that must be used in making a diagnosis
in order to comply with the standard of ordinary and reasonable care is
shown by the following two cases. The defendant physician in Connor v.
Eddyl had made several X-rays to discover broken bones. Subsequently,
another doctor located a fracture that the defendant had missed. In de-
ciding for the defendant, the court stated that the use of more X-rays would
have probably disclosed the fracture. However, requiring more X-rays would
increase the ordinary standard of care. Expert testimony showed that the
procedure followed by the defendant was customary and acceptable medical
procedure.
A similar situation occurred in Weintraub v. Rosen.' 2 The plaintiff
had a severe skull fracture and a fracture of the hip. The defendant phy-
sician stated that due to the seriousness of the skull fracture, further ex-
amination would have been dangerous. The court agreed with the defendant
to that extent but said that his failure to notice the hip fracture was negli-
gent, since the plaintiff continued in his care for a period of seven weeks.
This subsequent failure to notice the fracture was a breach of ordinary care.
Evidentiary requirements vary according to the factual situation. In
general, expert testimony is required to show that a mistaken diagnosis was
negligent.' 3 Yet, failure to use ordinary diagnostic procedure, such as X-ray,
establishes a prima facie case of negligence if the diagnosis is faulty and
further injury ensues. 14 It has been held that a cause of action for a negli-
gent diagnosis cannot be established absent expert witnesses. 15
As in any suit for negligence, the defendant's breach of duty in im-
properly diagnosing the malady must cause some injury. In Wade v.
Ravenswood Hosp. Ass'n,16 a hospital intern allegedly made a faulty pro-
visional diagnosis stating the injury was a concussion, whereas if X-rays and
a spinal puncture had been made a cervical fracture and spinal cord in-
jury would have been located. These tests were subsequently made and
during the period of these tests no intervening complications had developed.
10 149 Ill. App. 440 (3d Dist. 1909).
11 233 Ill. App. 20 (1st Dist. 1924).
12 93 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1937).
13 Wallace v. Yudelson, 244 Ill. App. 320 (lst Dist. 1927).
14 Polionos v. Renner, 190 Ill. App. 416 (3d Dist. 1914 Abstr.). Expert testimony is
probably required to show what would be ordinary diagnostic procedure under circum-
stances.
15 Graham v. St. Lukes Hosp., 46 Ill. App. 2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (lst Dist. 1964).
16 3 Ill. App. 2d 102, 120 N.E.2d 545 (1st Dist. 1954).
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The court held that since the two diagnoses were not necessarily inconsis-
tent and since no actual damages could be shown no cause of action existed.
DILIGENCE IN CARE AND DISCHARGE OF THE PATIENT
1 7
Prematurely discontinuing medical treatment or giving inadequate
care is a form of actionable negligence.' 8 The physician's discretion alone
is not determinative of how many calls should be made to a patient. Testi-
mony concerning the factual situation, which includes the patient's condi-
tion, medical history and emotional make-up, in conjunction with expert
testimony on medical practice can be used to show that the physician's at-
tendance was negligent. 19
A doctor in charge of a case has the duty of discharging a patient as
soon as possible but he has a corresponding duty to continue treatment as
long as sound medical practice dictates.2 0
If a doctor is discharged by a patient, he is not liable for any complica-
tions that develop after the discharge. An example of such a situation is
Kendall v. Brown.21 The defendant physician had been dismissed by the
plaintiff prior to the proper time for extension of a dislocated limb. It was
held that the defendant was not liable for shortening of the limb that could
have been alleviated by means of proper extension.
ERROR IN PRESCRIPTIONS
In Murdock v. Walker,22 the defendant doctor improperly wrote a pre-
scription for plaintiff's child. The improperly presecribed drug was poi-
sonous and the child died. The plaintiff went to a different pharmacy than
that recommended by the defendant. Testimony showed that it was proper
and customary for a druggist to check with the prescribing physician in a
situation like this when the prescription was on its face dangerous. There-
fore, the druggist was negligent. The court held that the defendant's negli-
gence was not cut off by the intervening negligence of the pharmacist nor
was it excused by the fact that the plaintiff went to a different pharmacy
than the recommended one.
WILLIAM J. JOOST
17 See Annot. 57 A.L.R.2d 379 (1958) lack of diligence; 57 A.L.R.2d 432 (1958) abandon-
ment.
18 Ritchey v. West, 23 I1. 385 (1860).
19 Church v. Adler, 350 Il1. App. 471, 113 N.E.2d 327 (3d Dist. 1953).
20 Southern Surety v. Harrisburg Hosp., 253 111. App. 458 (4th Dist. 1929).
21 74 Ill. 232 (1874).
22 43 11. App. 590 (1st Dist. 1891).
